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INTRODUCTION 
In Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics, James Phillips and 
Jesse Egbert identify an established tool called “corpus linguistics,” 
whose applications have been extended to aid legal interpretation.1 
In their view and mine, corpus linguistics is potentially a more 
valuable tool in legal interpretation than dictionaries have proven to 
be. While legal opinions have, especially in recent years, frequently 
 
* Edward Finegan is professor of linguistics and law, emeritus, at the University of 
Southern California. His interests include discourse analysis, lexicography, corpus linguistics, 
and forensic linguistics. He has testified as an expert in U.S. federal and state courts, chiefly in 
trademark disputes and defamation claims. He is a past president of the International 
Association of Forensic Linguists and curently serves as editor of Dictionaries: Journal of the 
Dictionary Society of North America. 
 1.  James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: 
Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve 
Corpus Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589. 
1.FINEGAN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  10:11 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1298 
cited semantic data—word senses—from dictionaries, reliance on and 
references to bodies of text called corpora are much more recent and 
rare despite the fact that corpus linguistics had its beginnings in the 
middle of the twentieth century. In both the title of their article and 
its contents, Phillips and Egbert urge an improved methodology in 
using corpora for legal interpretation. In particular, they see “valid 
and reliable answers to questions about the meaning of legal texts” 
as the goal of more sophisticated and scientifically sound 
methodological practices.2 In pursuit of that goal, they endorse 
survey and content-analysis methodologies in the design and use of 
corpora. As a general matter, their guidance is to be applauded 
and  implemented. There are, however, a few caveats that warrant 
further  discussion. 
Just as “law and lexicography” is not regarded as a subfield of 
law or of lexicography, regarding “law and corpus linguistics” as a 
subfield of law parallel to “law and economics,” as Phillips and 
Egbert do,3 is questionable in some respects.4 Still, reliance on 
corpora and the methods of corpus linguistics could, with proper 
corpus compilation and more sophisticated use, enhance the tools of 
legal interpretation, as it has enhanced the tools available to linguists 
serving as experts in various legal arenas for years.5 What Phillips and 
Egbert offer constitutes an invitation to more and better use of 
corpora in legal interpretation. Their article also signals a caution, 
however. As increased reliance on corpora makes its way into legal 
reasoning and court opinions, its utility and possible persuasiveness 
carry risks. As evidenced by published opinions, judges sometimes 
misunderstand the structure and substance of entries in so basic a 
 
 2.  Id. at 1592. 
 3.  Id. at 1608. 
 4.  Corpus linguistics is properly viewed more as a methodological tool than an 
intellectual subfield in the way that, say, phonetics, syntax, and semantics are subfields of 
linguistics, or law and economics is a subfield of law. 
 5.  Expert testimony by linguists has relied on corpora in contract interpretation, 
defamation, authorship attribution, trademark disputes (especially concerning genericity), and 
possibly elsewhere. See, e.g., Zipee Corp. v. USPS, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Or. 2000); Adam 
Kilgarriff, Corpus Linguistics in Trademark Cases, DICTIONARIES: J. DICTIONARY SOC’Y N. 
AM., 2015, at 100, 101. 
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reference work as the desk dictionary;6 the risks of misapprehending 
the structure of a corpus for particular interpretive purposes are 
greater still, as was the case with Judge Posner’s use of a Google 
search concerning the word harbor.7 Further, what is true of the 
corpus user is even more true of the corpus compiler. Bear in mind 
that lexicographers, whose professional training enables them to 
discern and define word senses from corpus data, explore data daily. 
Members of the legal profession lack equivalent training and are not 
likely to receive it in future.  
Reliance on corpora to determine word senses is not a new 
concept, and if “corpus” is understood to mean simply a body of 
texts, then corpora have been in use among lexicographers for at 
least a century and a half. In his nineteenth-century Scriptorium in 
Oxford, editor James Murray was surrounded by walls of 
pigeonholes containing millions of quotation slips, which are pieces 
of paper on which sentences were copied from books and mailed to 
him from readers throughout the English-speaking world.8 The 
paper slips were organized alphabetically according to the catchword 
in the sentence, and the slips for each catchword were organized 
chronologically in anticipation of the lexicographical work of 
drafting entries for the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Organized 
and reorganized in accordance with particular lexicographical needs, 
the slips constituted the basis of the entries in the OED, which aimed 
to trace the semantic development of every English word since its 
initial appearance in any text. Instead of paper slips, today’s 
lexicographers rely on computerized corpora, whose size and scope 
have grown as additional older texts are digitized by libraries, 
organizations, and companies such as Google. New digital texts are 
also generated daily in books, newspapers, magazines, legal opinions, 
blogs, emails, transcribed speeches, and other venues. Scientists, 
philosophers, historians, politicians, physicians, and almost everyone 
 
 6.  Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a 
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915. 
 7.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012); see also James C. 
Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: 
A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 2016 YALE L.J. F. 21, 28–29 (2016). 
 8.  PETER GILLIVER, THE MAKING OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2016) 
(relating the story of James Murray, and the Oxford English Dictionary). 
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else rely habitually on digitized texts, and countless numbers of 
people are creating them. The legal profession is acquainted with 
computerized corpora chiefly in Westlaw and LexisNexis. Phillips 
and Egbert note that the tools of corpus linguistics are beginning to 
appear as aids to interpretation in legal briefs, court opinions, and 
legal scholarship.9 There can be little doubt that exploiting 
appropriate corpora when addressing questions of legal 
interpretation may be more helpful than reliance on dictionaries has 
proven to be in past years.  
In this commentary, I strike two themes. The first is that Phillips 
and Egbert are right to recommend improved methodologies in 
corpus design and corpus exploitation.10 It is significant that they 
acknowledge that their recommendations present an ideal worth 
striving for, rather than a practical goal that most legal analysts can 
achieve on their own. Even so, much may be achieved under less-
than-ideal circumstances, and in this regard the perfect should not 
become the enemy of the good.  
The second theme, explored briefly in Part II, is central to all 
legal interpretation. It is the question of what is meant by “public 
meaning” and “ordinary meaning,” and just whose sense of “public” 
and “ordinary” a corpus should seek to represent. If frequency of 
meaning is a criterion for “public” or “ordinary,” computers can 
count it infallibly, but whether the appropriate criterion is frequency 
or something else has yet to be decided by legal theorists. 
Before proceeding, further explanation of the meaning of 
“corpus” will be helpful. Put simply, a modern corpus is a digitized 
body of texts. Using computer software, whether associated with a 
particular corpus (as with LexisNexis) or independent of it, 
researchers are able to search the texts in the corpus for particular 
words or expressions and to view and manipulate them in their 
contexts. There are, thus, good ways of homing in on and grouping 
meanings, as Phillips and Egbert explain in Part II of their article.11 
For annotated corpora (those that contain metadata such as a text’s 
author, date, and provenance, or a word’s part of speech in context), 
 
 9. See Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1. 
 10.  Id. at 1613–18. 
 11.  Id. at 1608. 
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more focused searches can be executed. Generally, corpora are 
compiled and annotated for particular purposes. For example, 
LexisNexis and Westlaw compile the texts of statutes and case law in 
various jurisdictions and annotate them to help users find what they 
are seeking. Other well-known corpora, such as the million-word 
Brown Corpus from the 1960s12 and the more recent 520-million-
word Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA),13 were 
created largely to enable systematic inquiry into language patterns in 
the English-language texts they incorporate. 
I. CORPUS SIZE AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Phillips and Egbert highlight the fact that corpus linguists differ 
about the relative importance placed on corpus representativeness 
and corpus size.14 Among others, they cite Douglas Biber for 
representativeness15 and Patrick Hanks for size.16 Biber’s research has 
focused especially on similarities and differences across registers of 
spoken and written English, while Hanks’s has focused on 
lexicographical matters, especially word senses.17 Biber’s 1993 papers 
argue persuasively for the need for representativeness in corpus 
compilation, and Phillips and Egbert are correct in saying that “[t]he 
goal of good corpus design is to prepare and execute a sampling plan 
that maximizes the chances of achieving a representative corpus,”18 
by which, following Biber, they mean a corpus that “includes the full 
range of variability in a population.”19 Two observations should be 
borne in mind about the work of Biber and others who stress the 
 
 12.  HENRY KUCČERA & W. NELSON FRANCIS, COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS OF PRESENT-
DAY AMERICAN ENGLISH (1967). 
 13. CORPUS CONTEMP. AM. ENG. (COCA), https://corpus.byu.edu/coca (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2018). 
 14. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1593. 
 15. See id. at 1594 (citing Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, 8 
LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 243 (1993) [hereinafter Biber, Representativeness in 
Corpus Design]; Douglas Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora for General Language 
Studies, 19  COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 219 (1993) [hereinafter Biber, Using Register-
Diversified  Corpora]). 
 16. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1594 (citing Patrick Hanks, The Corpus 
Revolution in Lexicography, 25 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 398, 415 (2012)). 
 17. See PATRICK HANKS, LEXICAL ANALYSIS: NORMS AND EXPLOITATIONS (2013). 
 18. Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1593. 
 19. Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, supra note 15, at 243. 
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necessity of representativeness. One observation is that their work—
Biber’s in particular—has focused on the differential 
distribution  of  grammatical features across registers, aiming 
through representativeness to create a basis for “general language 
studies,”20 as spelled out in the full title of the paper and 
as  encapsulated in the celebrated grammar of spoken and written 
English he spearheaded.21 
The other observation is that the corpora compiled for the work 
of Biber and Hanks, as well as that of Geoffrey Leech and John 
Sinclair (also cited by Phillips and Egbert),22 have been designed 
particularly to represent grammatical features (as with Biber and 
Leech) or the lexicon (as with Hanks and Sinclair) generally; they 
have not usually been designed to represent the meanings of 
particular expressions in particular historical texts, which is the 
central focus of legal interpretation. Because language features, 
including words and their meanings and functions, may differ from 
register to register (that is, across different situations of use), valid 
and reliable generalizations about “writing” or about “speech” must 
be drawn from a sample that is representative of written or of spoken 
texts. Language is too complex and too subtle, and registers too 
variable, to make generalizations based on texts that do not 
represent the population under investigation. For example, 
examining a corpus of transcribed talk among family members 
conversing over the dinner table cannot reliably reveal much about 
the linguistic features characteristic of conversations among academic 
colleagues at conferences or between physicians and patients in 
medical offices. Because generalizations can reflect no more than the 
sampled population, representativeness is crucial. Still, Biber and 
Hanks would agree that in corpus building, once representativeness 
is accounted for, size is significant. And both would likewise 
agree  that corpora of sufficient size are needed to generalize about 
“the  language.”23 
 
 20. Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora, supra note 15, at 219. 
 21.  See generally DOUGLAS BIBER, STIG JOHANSSON, GEOFFREY LEECH, SUSAN 
CONRAD, EDWARD FINEGAN, LONGMAN GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN 
ENGLISH  (1999). 
 22.  Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1592, 1598. 
 23.  Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora, supra note 15, at 240.  
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Of course, as Phillips and Egbert rightly emphasize, size alone 
cannot compensate for an unrepresentative corpus.24 To take an 
obvious example, no matter how many conversations are recorded, 
transcribed, and compiled in a corpus—no matter how big that 
corpus—it cannot reliably reveal anything about the language of 
scientific journals or legal opinions or any register other than 
conversation. As suggested by the dinner table example, different 
conversational environments may exhibit quite different vocabulary 
and grammatical features, as well as different meanings for the same 
words and different functions for the same grammatical features. On 
the other hand, given virtually unlimited digital capacity, a 
lexicographer who wanted to create a dictionary that laid out senses 
for each headword in different contexts could expediently choose to 
quarry as many texts from as many sources as possible—that is, 
without representativeness but without exclusion of any available 
texts. For certain lexicographical purposes, dispensing with the task 
of ensuring representativeness may be cost efficient, and little would 
be lost by including everything the lexicographers’ computers could 
digest. As Hanks puts it in a comment quoted unfavorably by 
Phillips and Egbert, “As long as the corpus builder can include a 
wide variety of source texts, it is neither necessary nor desirable to be 
too pernickety about questions of balance and representativeness.”25 
I take “a wide variety of source texts” to stand for an expedient way 
for a lexicographer to gain sufficient representativeness but not as 
suggesting that a corpus builder need not attend to representation. I 
also understand “pernickety” to mean unnecessarily fussy, and for a 
 
As the use of computer-based text corpora has become increasingly important for 
research in natural language processing, lexicography, and descriptive linguistics, 
issues relating to corpus design have also assumed central importance. Two main 
considerations are important here: 1) the size of the corpus (including the length 
and number of text samples), and 2) the range of text categories (or registers) that 
samples are collected from. 
Id. at 219 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that Biber’s work is generally concerned 
with minimum sample sizes. So far as I can tell, nowhere does he indicate that there are 
maximum sizes for corpora. It is fair to judge his view as: the bigger the better, given an 
adequate “range of text categories. . . . Future research should be based on larger corpora and 
include a wider representation of linguistic features and registers.” Id. at 219, 240. 
 24.  Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1598. 
 25.  Patrick Hanks, The Corpus Revolution in Lexicography, 25 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 
398, 415 (2012); Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1594. 
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lexicographer to be more than unnecessarily fussy (too pernickety) 
would be counterproductive.26 
Briefly, on the matter of survey sampling in creating a corpus, 
some of what needs to be observed is commonsensical, as Hanks 
would well understand. For example, if one wanted to examine the 
differences in the syntax and lexicon of Antonin Scalia’s dissenting 
and concurring opinions (as I have), one would need a corpus of 
those opinions, including annotations and metadata differentiating 
the two types of opinion (or a separate corpus for each type). It 
would be helpful to include as many opinions as possible within each 
category or even all of them unless there were reason to exclude 
some (for example, if one’s capacity to deal with large bodies of data 
were limited). In the case of excluding some data, care would need 
to be taken to ensure that the included texts were indeed 
representative and not biased in some unconscious way—perhaps too 
narrow in topic or chronology, for example. In pursuit of a different 
question, researchers could enlarge the corpus to include all U.S. 
Supreme Court concurring and dissenting opinions in a particular 
decade or on a particular constitutional provision or in any of 
numerous other ways. 
Phillips and Egbert “hypothesize that words are used differently 
in different registers,”27 a matter about which there is no doubt. Of 
course, they recognize that their hypothesis is accepted by corpus 
linguists generally—and certainly would be accepted by all 
lexicographers, including Sinclair and Hanks. The purpose, then, of 
their hypothesizing is not to discredit Sinclair and Hanks, who as 
proponents of the bigger-is-better school of corpus compilation 
would nevertheless not deny that “word use, . . . in terms of 
frequency and meaning, is heavily dependent on register.”28 It is, 
rather, to emphasize something easily overlooked by amateur corpus 
builders, namely, that in building a corpus of limited size the 
character of the included texts—in particular, the registers from 
 
 26.  Phillips and Egbert refer to Hanks’s view that “the main conventions of use of any 
word will be observable in any large corpus,” Hanks, supra note 25 at 415, as a “radical 
position,” Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1598. They also quote him as clearly recognizing 
and acknowledging the prerequisite need for “a wide variety of source texts.” Id. 
 27.  Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1600. 
 28.  Id. 
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which they come—must be a structured sample and must be 
representative of the intended population.29 
Despite sometimes using language less precise than desirable, 
every competent corpus linguist is aware that corpus design must go 
hand in glove with the research aims the corpus is intended to 
address. Phillips and Egbert state it this way: “Corpus design cannot 
be separated from research design.”30 They add that “[i]n most 
sciences and social sciences, researchers analyze a data set that they 
collected themselves” and that normally “this particular data set is 
never used again for another research study.”31 However, they point 
out, “in the field of corpus linguistics, it has become the norm to 
reuse the same data (or corpus) over and over again to answer a wide 
range of research questions in a multitude of research studies.”32 
Phillips and Egbert understand that, to the extent a corpus has been 
designed sufficiently broadly, it may legitimately be reused to answer 
a range of research questions.33 That is not to say that any question 
can legitimately be asked of any corpus. Because living languages 
change continually and American English usage has therefore 
changed significantly since the eighteenth century, questions about 
the original meaning of expressions in the Constitution cannot 
legitimately be probed in a corpus of twenty-first century English.  
On the other hand, for corpus developers and linguists who 
exploit corpora for grammatical studies, it may be entirely legitimate 
to use the same well-designed corpus for numerous investigations. 
To oversimplify, a corpus well designed to answer questions about, 
say, relative clauses—their frequency and character across registers—
might serve equally well for the study of adverbial clauses, noun 
clauses, and many other grammatical features. The cost and effort 
required to compile a large corpus cannot be readily duplicated, and 
such corpora are typically designed from the outset to provide data 
for a range of potential research questions involving grammar and 
lexicon. For meanings of expressions used in earlier times—more 
than two centuries ago for the Constitution—the texts examined 
 
 29.  Id. at 1603. 
 30.  Id. at 1595. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.  
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must reflect language usage of the time. Whether one wants to 
interpret, say, “cruel and unusual punishments”34 in terms 
appropriate to twenty-first century western sensibilities or those of 
the eighteenth century is a critical question—but not a question for 
the corpus linguist. If one relies on a corpus to help determine the 
meaning of the expression “cruel and unusual punishments” as 
understood at the time it was written, a valid corpus would comprise 
eighteenth-century texts, not texts written in the twentieth or 
twenty-first century. 
Representativeness and size are not incompatible. Much of the 
discussion about the importance of representativeness arose at a time 
when corpora were relatively small, making representative 
composition even more important. While reliance on an impressively 
large corpus drawn from inapposite or irrelevant register sources may 
yield incorrect answers to linguistic questions, including questions of 
meaning, arguments for representativeness have not focused on word 
senses. Instead, they have focused more on grammatical features, 
such as comparisons across registers of frequencies of various parts of 
speech or grammatical structures: nouns, verbs, relative clauses, and 
so on. For example, Biber has shown that the distribution of 
dependent clause types may differ across registers.35 It is also 
unquestionably true that the distribution of word senses differs 
across registers. Consider not only the well-known cases involving 
the verbs use,36 carry,37 and harbor,38 but other simple words such as 
cite, circuit, complaint, suit, opinion, feud, joint, appearance, rider, 
discovery, wrong, welfare, vacancies, blessings, ordain, magazines, 
quartered, and effects. These words are likely to carry quite different 
senses in legal contexts than they carry in other contexts. But corpus 
linguistics cannot reveal the contextual meaning of these words 
unless the interrogated corpus represents the language register 
(context) in which the disputed interpretations occur. 
 
 34.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 35.  Biber, Using Register-Diversified Corpora, supra note 15, at 221–22. 
 36.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 37.  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 38.  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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II. BEYOND CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
Beyond what Phillips and Egbert describe as necessary if the 
methods of corpus linguistics are legitimately to serve as tools for 
interpreting legal texts, there lie other more fundamental issues—
issues not for the corpus linguist but for the legal theorist. With 
respect to interpreting the Constitution and its amendments, before 
querying any corpus, no matter its representativeness and size, the 
parameters of a larger inquiry must be clear. Is the question simply, 
What is the most frequent meaning of a particular term in a 
particular context? Is it, What would an ordinary citizen reading a 
newspaper take the term in its context to mean? Or, What did the 
Founders likely intend to convey by using that term in that context? Are 
we seeking lawyers’ or citizens’ meaning, and—if the latter—which 
citizens: How well educated? Men, women, both? Living on which 
side of the Atlantic or both? How experienced in commerce or 
business or politics? These questions and others must be addressed 
even before the corpus is compiled to ensure inclusion of the 
relevant texts. If a consensus can be reached as to what must be 
answered—what, say, an ordinary reasonably well-informed citizen 
would understand by a word or expression in the text and context in 
which it occurs—then corpus linguistics can be of aid. In building a 
corpus designed to answer such questions, newspapers would be 
essential, particularly a selection of newspapers that is representative 
of appropriate geographical spread, chronology, and other relevant 
criteria. When relying on newspapers, it is not the language that 
reporters and editors use among themselves that is of interest but the 
language they use in their articles, because that is the language 
that,  as professionals, they reasonably deem their readers capable 
of  understanding. 
In a nutshell, the fundamental question that the legal theorist 
must answer is, What is meant by “ordinary meaning”? But to answer 
that, one must also ask: Where is it to be found? Who uses and 
understands it? Is it found in newspapers or novels? Or is it in plays, 
letters, or diaries? Further, if frequency determines what is 
“ordinary,” in which contexts—which registers—is frequency to be 
quantified? (In news articles or editorials? In mystery, romance, sci-fi, 
or all fiction? In conversation or only writing? British or North 
American? Just whose usage and under what circumstances of use?). 
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None of what I have said is intended to suggest that 
representativeness is unimportant; it is critically important, though 
perhaps not equally important for all purposes. Phillips and Egbert 
are right to highlight the importance of representativeness in 
identifying appropriate meanings for particular linguistic expressions 
in context.39 But equally fundamental questions, not about achieving 
representativeness, but about identifying and specifying what is being 
represented, must be answered if the aim in the marriage between 
law and corpus linguistics is to answer questions about meaning. 
Corpus linguistics can provide guidance in identifying resources for 
compiling a representative corpus of any kind, but only after legal 
theorists identify the target population of speakers and writers—in 
other words, people, registers, chronology, and so on. Corpus 
linguists can compile a corpus representing whatever legal theorists 
designate as the population of relevant texts. Their methodology can 
also provide user interfaces for querying corpora in ways that will be 
definitive, not in answering a question directly, but in providing 
the  data upon which a definitive answer may be based, and 
it  can  provide  the competing data so that interpreters can make 
any necessary  judgments. 
CONCLUSION 
Phillips and Egbert note that in order “[f]or corpus data to be 
used as a meaningful data source in legal proceedings, corpus 
creators and researchers will need to follow sound sampling 
principles and practices and provide evidence to support the design 
and representativeness of their corpora.”40 Those are high standards, 
higher than ones often expected in scholarship, but this is fitting 
because the stakes are higher in law than in most other arenas. 
Lexicographers may justifiably make expedient choices when 
compiling dictionaries by exploiting corpora encompassing a wide 
variety of texts and text types even when not systematically 
representative. The representativeness urged by linguists interested in 
describing language generally has its underpinnings in good science 
 
 39.  See Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1. 
 40.  Id. at 1592–93. 
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and in a commitment to description that will stand up to scrutiny.41 
Standards in law are higher than those in lexicography or grammar.  
As a further consideration, if corpora are to be accessed by 
judges, attorneys, and legal scholars, readily usable software must 
accompany the corpora, along with guidelines for querying each 
individual corpus and identifying what questions it can and cannot 
answer. We should be mindful that a dictionary’s front matter—
including what is called the “guide to the dictionary”—has often 
eluded the attention of judges42 (and others). If corpora are to be 
maximally useful tools for interpreting legal texts, instruction 
comparable to that in a dictionary’s front matter is essential, and 
users must understand and honor that guidance. Further, if it is 
necessary for users to understand the possibilities and limitations of 
particular corpora, it is even more necessary for corpus compilers to 
do so, including the amateur ones Phillips and Egbert imagine 
inhabiting the chambers of appellate judges and the offices of well-
to-do law firms.43 The lessons to be learned from recognizing how 
some judges and their law clerks have poorly understood how to 
read a dictionary’s entries make it incumbent on those working at 
the intersection of law and corpus linguistics to do everything 
possible to help ensure rigorous corpus compilation and utilization. 
Phillips and Egbert have provided a map for jurists and legal 
scholars to find their way to valid understandings of expressions 
appearing in legal texts where meaning is disputed. This map helps 
navigate fundamental interpretive questions: What does a particular 
expression in a particular sentence in a particular legal text mean? 
What would a particular expression have been understood to mean at 
the time it was written? These are the kinds of questions that corpus 
linguistics can help answer, and the guidance offered by Phillips 
and  Egbert goes a long way in ensuring that the enterprise is 
scientifically  sound. 
  
 
 41.  BIBER ET AL., supra note 21. 
 42.  Mouritsen, supra note 6. 
 43.  Phillips & Egbert, supra note 1, at 1617. 
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